Internal political consequences
OF THE Oil-and-gas crisis

Viktar Charnou,
political scientist, executive director of PA “Open Society”,
Siarhej Nikolyuk, political observer (Belarus)

After V. Putin came into power, and in particular after the 2004 referendum, Belarus ? Russia relations became rather lukewarm. The leaders of Belarus and Russia happened to have very different economic interests and lines of policy, so that it was no longer possible to continue their close rapprochement within the framework of the announced concept of the Union State. In the relationship between the two countries, now there was a tendency to conserve the achieved position of affairs with a possibility of a serious breakdown at any moment. Such a disruption did take place at the end of 2006 when both sides entered the oil-and-gas conflict which resulted in a very difficult decision for Belarusan economy, i.e. a stage-by-stage transition to the world prices for the Russian energy carriers.

Nowadays, Belarus’s direct losses appear not to be as large as it could be expected at the end of December of the previous year. However, the outlook of constant appreciation of oil and gas did disturb Belarus political society, thus leading to certain changes in foreign and especially domestic politics of the ruling class. It has also revealed new lines of a conflict tensions among the opposition and strengthened a divisive issue in the country.

As for the foreign policy aspect, Belarus ? Russia conflict has allowed many analysts to start talking about a thaw possibility of Belarus’s attitude towards the West. In addition to the conflict’s general logic, such conclusions were based on numerous statements by Lukashenko himself. Still, how real is this foreign policy reorientation? By our reckoning, it is close to zero. There are only attempts of economic and political rapprochement with the ideologically related regimes such as Venezuela, Iran and Sudan. Foreign policy is sequential to domestic one, while “at home” there are no signs of changes, economic reforms or democratic transformations at all. The Belarusan economic model functions, first of all, at the expense of the rent taken from somebody else’s natural resources. During the years of the rent-oriented behaviour, political institutes typical for similar economy have appeared in Belarus. Neither Lukashenko, nor his team can transform them.

Strange as it may appear, many representatives of the Belarusan opposition are not able to change either. Accusations against Russia because of the emersed hydrocarbonic conflict can be heard frequently from their side. Many oppositional politicians consider the price rise to be the beginning of the imperial expansion. It seems to us that even if Russia deserves these charges, then it must be blamed not for the upward adjustment, but for keeping the prices on a low level for many years. Russia has been paying not only for Belarus’s economic stability but also for a complete absence of economic reforms, economic initiatives and political life, as well as, in many respects, the absence of any prospects.

On the other side, inside the opposition itself, a group of pro-Russia-oriented politicians influenced by the oil-and-gas conflict, has appeared. Recently, they have presented a very emotional, but completely unpersuasive “Minsk Manifesto of Belarus ? Russia Unification”. In their opinion, Belarus has no other vistas, but to join the body of Russia as an associated subject, to make its gas and oil pipelines Russia’s property and to introduce the Russian rouble.

In sober fact, Belarus is quite a self-sufficient state which is capable of settling its matters independently. In order to solve its problems, it does not have to toss away its political sovereignty or the national currency. Today, this point of view is shared both by united democratic opposition and authorities, as well as the majority of Belarusan society.

After the oil-and-gas conflict, some analysts have even seen an occasion to put Lukashenko in one line with fighters for Belarus independence such as Zianon Pazniak. This comparison is completely incorrect. We can only say that at the given stage there is some concurrence of interests of nationally-oriented society and those of the ruling political regime. However, the authorities’ main objective is the retention of power.

Still, Belarus is not North Korea ? while the military forces are important for the retention of power, the chief of state remembers constantly that he is "nationally elected". Therefore, it is not casual that the social programmes’ costs constitute more than a half of Belarus’s consolidated budget. Such "generosity" is impossible without effectively functioning economy which, in its turn, requires effective bureaucracy. The latter is especially actual for Belarus ? unlike the western colleagues, a Belarusan civil servant is the main character in the process of the material values’ production and the main (if not only) controller of this process.

In democratic countries, the basic controller is mass media independent from the state. In autocratic ones ? the specialized state structures. As a rule, they are numerous, and it is not surprising ? controllers are the same bureaucrats. They themselves need controllers. It is not necessary that the information they get, will be given directly to the orderer. There is always an enticement "to give" it to the body under observation. Certainly, not for free.

The stage of “your power resources in exchange for our brotherly kisses” in Belarus ? Russia relations is apparently over. Belarus is on the edge of a crisis, and a crisis is a stage in the system’s development when the system finds itself inadequate for the changed external challenges. Today, Belarus needs desperately innovational political solutions, but there is simply nobody to find them. In the country, there is no public policy in the true senseof the word politics, i.e. a sphere of independent actions of diverse political actors who can choose purposes for the social development, competitiveness of alternative political lines and leaders supervised by voters and independent mass media. Therefore, amplification of the political control from above is the only solution the head of the Belarusan state has in his administrative arsenal. It is his main answer to the challenges of postindustrial society. One more answer of his is amplification of centralization in economy.

What is to be expected in a medium-term prospect? Our forecast is the following: in proportion to Russia’s reductions of grants, stress is going to increase inside the presidential "vertical". Total professional uselessness of those who represent the Belarusan ruling elite (their inability to be adequate in any complex situation) will become an additional factor to aggravate the crisis. Lukashenko's reaction can be predicted easily ? he will keep cracking down. The most important step in this direction is already taken: Victor Lukashenko is inserted into the body of Security Council, and as a result his status of an assistant to the President is actually equal to that of the KGB chairman or the chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

However, besides the authorities and oppositions, there is also society in Belarus. The absence of a public discussion in the monopolized state-run mass media had left Belarusan society in the dark about the approaching economic problems. That’s why it is no wonder that the majority of citizens had not worried. Moreover, even when tensions in Belarus ? Russia relations had been growing, confidence in tomorrow (the main quality of the Soviet people) had still been increasing every month. According to the polls of the National Institute of Social, Economic and Political Research (NISEPR) in 2004 ? 2006, public optimism had taken a huge step forward (see Table № 1). It was this wave of optimism that coloured the latest presidential election in Belarus.

Table № 1. Distribution of answers to the question, “In your opinion, what will happen to the social economic situation in Belarus next year?”; percentage

The oil-and-gas conflict did really horrify Belarusan society. As a result, in 2007 the number of optimists has reduced almost two times, whereas the number of pessimists, on the contrary, has grown more than two times.

The Belarusans’ optimism is in full accordance with their belief in correctness of the line chosen by the country and associated with A. Lukashenko (see Table № 2). Still, one thing must be mentioned here. Behind the still high figure of general approval (61.6 percent, the end of the previous year), there is a hidden picture of a deep split of Belarusan society. If we specify the groups of supporters and opponents of the authorities, the split will become even more obvious.

Another thing is that the number of supporters of the President is still rather high. Three years of a double-digit growth of incomes could not pass unheeded. Now, according to various data, the number of supporters is 46 ? 48 percent, which is approximately two times more than the number of opponents (20 ? 25 percent). However, in October 2006, more than a quarter of citizens of Belarus did not think of their attitude to the authorities (26.2 percent, according to the NISEPR data). They were nonchalant about it.

Table № 2. Distribution of answers to the question, “In your opinion, as a whole, is the state of things in our country going to develop in a correct or wrong direction?”, percentage

Such a high percentage of the indifferent is typical for an after-election period. Unlike the predecessor, i.e. the Soviets, the present Belarusan authorities have no more internal resources to maintain a high level of society mobilization during a long period of time. Nevertheless, in January 2007, A. Lukashenko did decide to start another mobilization campaign which, as shown by the results of the latest polls, has happened to be drawn. Mass media could not play their traditional role, and the fear of an approaching threat of material losses has not forced politically inert citizens “to wake up” and line up behind the President. Therefore, the level of electoral support has remained the same.

At the same time, there are more and more active factors that aggravate financial conditions or slow down incomes which growth rate has already become habitual. According to NISEPI data, if in November 2006, 12.8 percent of respondents noted deterioration of their financial condition for the previous three months, then in May 2007, their number reached 17.7 percent. Similar dynamics is noticed by NOVAK Laboratory polls. In December 2006, an aggravation of a family’s financial condition for the latest month was marked by 15.9 percent of the interrogated, and in March 2007 ? 18.8 percent. Freezing of growth of pensions which have not been increased since October 2006, a constant growth of tariffs for housing-and-municipal services, forthcoming cancellation of social privileges, amplification of a fiscal character of extractive policy, all these are not only the direct social consequences of Belarus’s movement to the global prices for energy carriers, but the factors of possible future political changes, too.

Today, the power in contemporary Belarus leans basically not on the President’s charisma, not on a popular ideology and not even on the Army, but on instrumental support of rationally thinking and acting inhabitants. During the election campaigns, it simply purchases their support. Since 2004, the electoral rating of the chief of state has been growing quickly, but not due to the charisma or ideology, but thanks to “strong social policy”, a growth of salaries and pensions. However, instrumental support has one unpleasant feature which is the following ? it is conditional, less strong and more corrosible than emotional support. If emotional support is getting closer to zero and simultaneously, one day people find out that the promises are not fulfilled, inhabitants reject not only the people personifying the political regime, but the system itself as well.

Эканамічныя і палітычныя перспектывы Беларусі ва ўмовах рынкавай эканомікі

9—10 чэрвеня 2007 г.

Тэзісы

1. Аксиологические и экономические детерминанты общественного выбора Беларуси в 2007 – 2015 годах. Леонид Заико, руководитель аналитического центра “Стратегия”, экономист (Беларусь).
Аксіялагічныя і эканамічныя дэтэрмінанты грамадскага выбару Беларусі ў 2007 – 2015 гадах. Леанід Заіка, кіраўнік аналітычнага цэнтра “Стратэгія”, эканаміст (Беларусь).

2. Возможности повышения уровня жизни населения Беларуси в условиях роста цен на энергоносители. Леонид Злотников, кандидат экономических наук (Беларусь).
Магчымасці павышэння ўзроўню жыцця насельніцтва Беларусі ва ўмовах росту коштаў на энерганосьбіты. Леанід Злотнікаў, кандыдат эканамічных навук (Беларусь).
Ways to increase the living standard of the population of Belarus in the context of the energy carriers’ price rise. Leonid Zlotnikov, Economic Sciences Candidate (Belarus).

3. Українські реалії і білоруські перспективи: уроки, загрози, можливості. Андрій Кирчів, аналітик (Україна).
Украінскія рэаліі і беларускія перспектывы: урокі, пагрозы, магчымасці. Андрэй Кірчыў, аналітык (Украіна).
Ukrainian realities and belarusan prospects: lessons, threats, possibilities. Andrei Kirchiv, analyst (Ukraine).

4. Праблемы рынкавай трансфармацыі Беларусі. Кірыл Коктыш, кандыдат палітычных навук, дацэнт кафедры палітычнай тэорыі МДІМЗ (У) МЗС (Расія).

5. Трансформационные задачи Беларуси. Михаил Маринич, экс-министр внешнеэкономических связей Беларуси, экс-посол Беларуси в Латвии, Эстонии и Финляндии, доктор наук (Беларусь).
Трансфармацыйныя задачы Беларусі. Міхаіл Марыніч, экс-міністр знешнеэканамічных сувязяў Беларусі, экс-амбасадар Беларусі ў Латвіі, Эстоніі і Фінляндыі, доктар навук (Беларусь).

6. Альтернативные источники поставок энергоносителей Беларусь – пиар-акция или реальность Олег Мусловец, директор Интернет-ресурса Агентство финансовых новостей (Беларусь).
Альтэрнатыўныя крыніцы пастаўкі энерганосьбітаў у Беларусь — піяр-акцыя альбо рэчаіснасць? Алег Муславец, дырэктар інтэрнэт-рэсурсу “Агенцтва фінансавых навінаў” (Беларусь)
Alternative sources of energy carriers supply to Belarus – PR action or reality. Oleg Muslovets, Director of Financial News Agency internet resource (Belarus).

7. Паміж Масквой і Бруселем (перспектывы “новай” знешняй палітыкі Беларусі). Уладзімір Роўда, кандыдат філасофскіх навук, дацэнт кафедры паліталогіі ЕГУ (Беларусь)
Between Moscow and Brussels (prospects of Belarus’s new foreign policy). Uladzimir Rouda, Philosophic Sciences Candidate (Belarus).

8. Досвід України у формуванні системи енергетичної безпеки та можливості його застосування в Білорусі. Соскін Олег Ігорович, директор Інституту трансформації суспільства, професор, завідувач кафедри міжнародної економіки та підприємництва Національної академії управління (Україна).
Досвед Украіны ў фармаванні сістэмы энергетычнай бяспекі і магчымасці яго прымянення ў Беларусі. Алег Соскін, дырэктар Інстытута трансфармацыі грамадства, прафесар Нацыянальнай акадэміі кіравання (Украіна)

9. Внутриполитические последствия нефтегазового кризиса. Виктор Чернов, политолог, исполнительный директор ОО “Открытое общество”, Сергей Николюк, политический обозреватель (Беларусь).
Унутрыпалітычныя наступствы нафтагазавага крызісу. Віктар Чарноў, палітолаг, выканаўчы дырэктар ГА “Адкрытае грамадства”, Сяргей Нікалюк, палітычны аглядальнік (Беларусь).
Internal political consequences of the oil-and-gas crisis. Viktar Charnou, political scientist, executive director of PA “Open Society”, Siarhej Nikolyuk, political observer (Belarus).