BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BRUSSELS
(PROSPECTS OF BELARUS’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY)

Uladzimir Rouda,
Philosophic Sciences Candidate (Belarus)

During the previous round table organized by the International Public Society Belarusans’ World Association Backauscyna (Homeland), one author’s article said, “in 2007, there will be considerable changes in the Belarusan state’s political system. Despite the formal stability, Lukashenko’s political boat will hardly manage to come successfully between Scylla of European democracy and Charybdis of incorporation to Russia.

The events of this year’s first half allow us to prove this conclusion wrong, as it did not take into account Lukashenko’s well-known ability to stay on the float, only resorting to purely cosmetic measures instead of a cardinal reform of his domestic and foreign politics of the country. One of such measures was the so-called “new foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus”, advertised quite well by the official circles, where, out of the blue, there was as if a new European wing added to the old Russian one, which would enable flight stabilization of the independent “Belarusan aircraft”.

The last year’s scenario was based on the conclusion that in order to force Lukashenko to accept Putin’s project of a Union State, Russia would resort to rather harsh economic pressure, quickly transferring the economic relations between the two countries into the market rails. In its turn, it had to blow up the stability of the so-called Belarusan economic model used by Lukashenko’s populism, the major basis of legitimacy of the authoritarian dictatorship in Belarus. In other words, in order to preserve power in his hands, Lukashenko had to accept his status decrease, to refuse a number of important features of state independence and to join gradually the Russian Federation.

In its turn, the European Union, not aiming at cancelling Belarus’s sovereignty and not appealing to our country to become a member of the club of rich democratic countries, did offer us a number of economic preferences which could help Belarus survive the pressure from East. However, the Europeans also wanted Lukashenko to implement the well-known 12 conditions which could be the beginning of the long-expected political and economic reforms in our country. The EU offers addressed, first of all, citizens of Belarus. It means Brussels hoped sincerely that it could help the Belarusan opposition and civil society’s structures to start an effective struggle against the authoritarian castle and would, at last, help them take it by storm, thus carrying out a non-violent “colour revolution”.

However, the external and internal factors which may allow us to hope for changes in Belarus, are not working yet. First, after the period of perplexity and shock, when the Belarusan authorities suddenly refused to carry out a referendum concerning a constitutional act of a Union State, thus preserving the usual old costs for the Russian energy carriers, Moscow did find new ways in its policy towards the incompliant ally from Minsk – it did not refuse its strategic goal, i.e. incorporation of Belarus to Russia, but decided to go in this direction step by step, extending the process itself in several years. During the first stage, the Russian authorities will try to minimize the economic losses from the allied relations with Lukashenko, to provide preferences for Russian companies who work with Belarus, to lessen its own dependence on the materials’ transit to the West through our territory. At the same time, the Kremlin has to block any attempts of the Belarusan authorities to overcome the country’s isolation.

Only after that, Moscow can initiate the second stage of its strategy, i.e. to impose on Minsk the Russian variant of the Constitutional Act of the so-called Union State, to introduce Russian rouble as the only means of payment on both countries’ territories, to form the supranational governing institutions, etc. During this stage, Moscow can try to use different variants of its political behaviour. It can cooperate with Lukashenko in case it sees he can be pressed. Or, it can stake on somebody else who is more manageable and who will play the role of the leader of pro-Russian opposition in Belarus. The search for such a figure, his promotion and introduction to the political game will also require time and money. Right now, as many Russian analysts admit, the Kremlin has been staking Lukashenko only, considering him the best figure to carry out the “incorporation” scenario already in 2007.

Second, there are big problems with implementation of a new strategy of the European Union concerning Belarus. Brussels did overestimate the Belarusan opposition’s forces and its ability to make use of the preferable situation during the aggravation peak of Belarus – Russia relations in order to start a new wave of protests aimed at pressing the country’s regime so that the latter would have to initiate reforms and receive the necessary support from Europe. After the 2006 political campaign’s debacle, the Belarusan opposition found itself in a very difficult situation.

It is known that for Lukashenko’s government, the implementation of the 12 conditions could be a much worse variant than even incorporation to Russia because all of them are oriented at destructing the system of authoritarian power of the Belarusan President. Therefore, the official Minsk cannot accept the Brussels plan as it would be equal to Lukashenko’s signing of a pact of his unconditional surrender. Today, neither external, nor internal situations can make him do it yet.

The Belarusan regime has used to the full the rhetoric about the new foreign policy towards Europe in order to receive new preferences in its economic relations with Russia. The talks concerning the gas matter brought better results for Belarus than one could expect. Belarus still pays less than the other CIS countries for 1,000 cubic meters of gas. Regardless of the step-by-step sale of Beltransgaz shares to Gazprom, Lukashenko has kept his right of the “golden share”. At the end of March, a new trade agreement with Russia was signed. By the way, it is the EU, not Russia, that is the basic foreign trade partner of Belarus, as the EU has 60 percent of the country’s trade turnover. Despite the fact that Belarus was excluded from the General Preference System and that the official authorities criticized it much, this measure did not include European sales of products processed by Belarusan oil refineries. All the consequences of the energy carriers’ price rise may only lead to a curtail of the GDP growth speed, but not to an economic crisis the liberal economists used to write about.

I share the opinion of the Slovak and English political analysts Balas Jarabik and Alastair Rabagliatti who say that nowadays “it is difficult to get rid of the impression that the EU policy has failed, which was inevitable. The problem is not in the policy itself, but in its implementation. There were no better variants than those numerous ones proposed by authors who based them on the studies ordered by the EU. Still, this policy does not work in Belarus when there are Russian lavish subsidia. Especially when it does not specify priorities and strategy, when practical implementation always lags behind the actual problems, when it is practically impossible to present the ideas to the Belarusan nation, when the EU cannot offer any serious stimuli to the Belarusans, except for various rhetoric about a higher living standard. Still, for present-day isolated Belarus, even this may be a powerful instrument. Especially when the EU recaptures the initiative and will not be limited to only react to the Belarusan authorities’ actions, as it did before. Neither Lukashenko, nor the Belarusan opposition can offer any prospects for Belarus in the 21st century. And if the Kremlin continues its present course, then in a year or two, the base of the Belarusan economic miracle will be blown up. Then, the EU rhetoric will be stronger.”

I think there is a chance it might not happen as there are also other, not less important problems with the EU strategy towards Belarus.

First, it is passive for the most part and oriented at waiting the negative results of Russia’s economic pressure of Belarus. This is a traditional line of the European Union that has not understood yet the importance of its new role as not only the biggest economic, but also political actor in the region after 2004. If the waiting strategy is not changed, then there are no guarantees at all that it will be Europe, not Russia, that will be the first to take advantages of its own policy concerning Belarus.

Second, the EU strategy’s developers have not chosen their attitude towards Lukashenko yet. “To build contacts with the authorities or to preserve the trade preferences – it means to loose their face, to do the opposite is to deepen the country’s isolation.” I think in today’s conditions it is more important to break Belarus’s isolation than to keep the face of correspondent EU officials and politicians because only this step can guarantee Belarus’s state independence, thus opening vistas for future democratization. The opposite course will only increase chances of Russia’s long-term strategy for success in this region.

Third, there is no unity in understanding the strategy and the means of its implementation by some EU institutions and member states. It is well-known, for instance, that our neighbours, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, were against Belarus’s exclusion from the General Preference System; Czech Republic and Slovakia abstained. The first two countries together with Ukraine hope to create a “quartet of presidents”, including Kaczynski, Adamkus, Yushchenko and Lukashenko, in order to seek for coordinated policy against Russia’s energy blackmail. These initiatives take place without the necessary agreement of positions with Brussels.

Fourth, help to the Belarusan political opposition and civil society’s structures must be coordinated and oriented at spurring the coalitional construction, surpassing the split and the negative aftermaths of the failed political campaign in 2006. A very important role in accepting decisions by the European donors must be played by the objective evaluation of the situation inside the Belarusan parties, movements and NGOs right now. In my opinion, the opposition must fight against the regime, not only talk endlessly about their rights infringement, thus earning the right to participate in the would-be dialogue between the EU and the Belarusan authorities.

Fifth, in order to win in the competition with Russia concerning the influence on Eastern Europe, the EU must resort to active politics in spreading and popularizing the European values, thus providing all countries’ desire to join the EU in the near future. I agree with the American political analyst Thomas Ambrosio that the EU must carry out active policy of “regionalism, conditionality and integration.”

Thus, in order to terminate the Belarusan dictator’s use of rhetoric about his “new” foreign policy, aimed at getting concessions from Russia and Europe, the EU must first reconsider its strategy towards Belarus. It may become step-by-step policy, designed for a certain period, i.e. during the first stage, the regime frees political prisoners and guarantees that nobody will be criminally prosecuted for their political views. For that, Lukashenko and his officials could receive the right to enter the civilized countries of the world, and a dialogue could be started. During the second stage, the economic and law reform must be the centre of attention. Only if Lukashenko carries out such changes, it is possible to allot credits and preferential investments to Belarusan economy. At last, during the third stage, it is possible to start democratizing the country’s political system. It has no sense to carry out free and transparent elections prior to that because there will be no layers of beneficiaries from these reforms, i.e. those who will bring success to the democratic forces and will be able to muster up the population in order to defend the victory.

Эканамічныя і палітычныя перспектывы Беларусі ва ўмовах рынкавай эканомікі

9—10 чэрвеня 2007 г.

Тэзісы

1. Аксиологические и экономические детерминанты общественного выбора Беларуси в 2007 – 2015 годах. Леонид Заико, руководитель аналитического центра “Стратегия”, экономист (Беларусь).
Аксіялагічныя і эканамічныя дэтэрмінанты грамадскага выбару Беларусі ў 2007 – 2015 гадах. Леанід Заіка, кіраўнік аналітычнага цэнтра “Стратэгія”, эканаміст (Беларусь).

2. Возможности повышения уровня жизни населения Беларуси в условиях роста цен на энергоносители. Леонид Злотников, кандидат экономических наук (Беларусь).
Магчымасці павышэння ўзроўню жыцця насельніцтва Беларусі ва ўмовах росту коштаў на энерганосьбіты. Леанід Злотнікаў, кандыдат эканамічных навук (Беларусь).
Ways to increase the living standard of the population of Belarus in the context of the energy carriers’ price rise. Leonid Zlotnikov, Economic Sciences Candidate (Belarus).

3. Українські реалії і білоруські перспективи: уроки, загрози, можливості. Андрій Кирчів, аналітик (Україна).
Украінскія рэаліі і беларускія перспектывы: урокі, пагрозы, магчымасці. Андрэй Кірчыў, аналітык (Украіна).
Ukrainian realities and belarusan prospects: lessons, threats, possibilities. Andrei Kirchiv, analyst (Ukraine).

4. Праблемы рынкавай трансфармацыі Беларусі. Кірыл Коктыш, кандыдат палітычных навук, дацэнт кафедры палітычнай тэорыі МДІМЗ (У) МЗС (Расія).

5. Трансформационные задачи Беларуси. Михаил Маринич, экс-министр внешнеэкономических связей Беларуси, экс-посол Беларуси в Латвии, Эстонии и Финляндии, доктор наук (Беларусь).
Трансфармацыйныя задачы Беларусі. Міхаіл Марыніч, экс-міністр знешнеэканамічных сувязяў Беларусі, экс-амбасадар Беларусі ў Латвіі, Эстоніі і Фінляндыі, доктар навук (Беларусь).

6. Альтернативные источники поставок энергоносителей Беларусь – пиар-акция или реальность Олег Мусловец, директор Интернет-ресурса Агентство финансовых новостей (Беларусь).
Альтэрнатыўныя крыніцы пастаўкі энерганосьбітаў у Беларусь — піяр-акцыя альбо рэчаіснасць? Алег Муславец, дырэктар інтэрнэт-рэсурсу “Агенцтва фінансавых навінаў” (Беларусь)
Alternative sources of energy carriers supply to Belarus – PR action or reality. Oleg Muslovets, Director of Financial News Agency internet resource (Belarus).

7. Паміж Масквой і Бруселем (перспектывы “новай” знешняй палітыкі Беларусі). Уладзімір Роўда, кандыдат філасофскіх навук, дацэнт кафедры паліталогіі ЕГУ (Беларусь)
Between Moscow and Brussels (prospects of Belarus’s new foreign policy). Uladzimir Rouda, Philosophic Sciences Candidate (Belarus).

8. Досвід України у формуванні системи енергетичної безпеки та можливості його застосування в Білорусі. Соскін Олег Ігорович, директор Інституту трансформації суспільства, професор, завідувач кафедри міжнародної економіки та підприємництва Національної академії управління (Україна).
Досвед Украіны ў фармаванні сістэмы энергетычнай бяспекі і магчымасці яго прымянення ў Беларусі. Алег Соскін, дырэктар Інстытута трансфармацыі грамадства, прафесар Нацыянальнай акадэміі кіравання (Украіна)

9. Внутриполитические последствия нефтегазового кризиса. Виктор Чернов, политолог, исполнительный директор ОО “Открытое общество”, Сергей Николюк, политический обозреватель (Беларусь).
Унутрыпалітычныя наступствы нафтагазавага крызісу. Віктар Чарноў, палітолаг, выканаўчы дырэктар ГА “Адкрытае грамадства”, Сяргей Нікалюк, палітычны аглядальнік (Беларусь).
Internal political consequences of the oil-and-gas crisis. Viktar Charnou, political scientist, executive director of PA “Open Society”, Siarhej Nikolyuk, political observer (Belarus).